Darwin's proof, Chapter 6, part 1

After a long delay, I am ready to review chapter 6 of Darwin's Proof, by Cornelius G Hunter. You will find the reviews of earlier chapters in other recent posts. I think chapter 6 is getting into the meat of the book. Previous chapters have been routine criticisms of evolution. In this chapter, Hunter gets into his main philosophical argument. I believe this is the argument for which he is best known--I understand it was the main focus of his earlier book. Again this argument is not unique, but he makes it in perhaps a slightly different way than other creationists.

What is Hunter's key argument? He argues that evolution is a religion, just like creationism. More specifically, he claims that the evidence for evolution depends on theological assumptions and would not be valid without these. Unfortunately for Hunter, when you look at the implications of his argument, it only shows why intelligent design fails as science.

To understand Hunter's argument, we need to take one of the categories of evidence for evolution. Let's take the existence of vestigial organs. He does the exact same analysis with every kind of evidence for evolution, so we can use this as an example. First, he claims that it is not really evidence for evolution itself. Evolution would not necessarily predict this. Usually he is wrong about this, as I will show. He argues that it is only evidence if it contrasted with some version of creationism. So he says that the only way vestigial organs are evidence for evolution is if you argue that God would not produce useless structures. It's not that vestigial organs are direct evidence for evolution, rather vestigial organs are evidence against creation. At this point, he usually quotes a few biologists saying that this item (vestigial organs, etc.) could not possibly have been created by God. His final point is that this argument depends on theological assumptions about God. It assumes one particular kind of God. Who is to say that God wouldn't produce useless structures? Evolutionary biologists are assuming a particular kind of God, such as a God like a human designer, and vestigial organs are only evidence for evolution if you assume the existence of that particular God. Thus, vestigial organs are only evidence for evolution within some theological frameworks and depends on religious assumptions.

Unfortunately, his argument fails at every level. All of the kinds of evidence he discusses are in fact predicted or explained by evolution, and would be evidence for evolution even without consideration of creationism as an alternative. Common arrangement of pseudogenes are clear evidence for common descent, by themselves. The biogeographic patterns of organims make most sence and are explained by common places of origins of groups of species. The nested pattern of similarities of organisms are exactly what is expected from evolution, and Darwin was the first person to explain why this pattern would exist. The same is true of all of the other kinds of evidence. For all of these, Hunter claims that they are not directly predicted by evolution, but only work as evidence against creationism.

The easiest way to see that this is not so is to consider what we would think if no one had ever thought of creationism as an explanation for species. If Hunter is correct, the evidence for evolution is only evidence against creationism, not evidence for evolution. In that case, if there was a world where no one had ever considered the possibility that God created species, none of this evidence would be convincing. There isn't a single category of evidence that wouldn't be convincing in such a world. Both Humans and Chimpanzees lack the gene to make vitamin C, and is inactivated with exactly the same mutation in both species. This can be explained by a single mutation being inherited by both species, without any reference to God.

In fact, there is such an example of common descent without comparison to theological arguments. The languages of the world are related by common descent. How do we know this? Languages form nested patterns of similarity. Languages have vestigial spellings and odd meanings and words. Languages show geographic patterns similar to organisms. Languages have old manuscripts that show a pattern of progressive change. All of these are evidence that languages evolved from a common ancestor, without having to bring in any theological assumptions. These are the same kinds of evidence used to show evolution of life.

Of course, Hunter can find many quotes of scientists saying that God would not have made vestigial structures or nested patterns, etc. That's because they are arguing against creationism. Like it or not, creationism is a commonly held belief out there, so it is common to show how evolution explains things better than creationism. Hunter objects to the fact that these scientists bring up God when they do this. How exactly can you argue against a religious claim without bringing up religion?

That is the essence of Hunters argument. When scientists argue against religious arguments, they use religious assumptions, therefore evolution is religion. He never explains how we could possibly argue against ID or creationism without ever actually mentioning the designer or God at the heart of the theory.

However, Hunter is correct in one key point: whenver anyone argues against creationism, you have to make some theological assumptions. If I argue that there is no logical reason for God to put the exact same mutation in both Humans and Chimps, I am making assumptions about what God would and would not do. If I say that the vertebrate eye seems to be poorly designed and God would not make such an eye, I am assuming that God would want to make well designed things. Hunter repeatedly points out that this might not be the case. God could have made things this way for his own inscrutible reasons. He never actually offers a single explanation for why God would have done it this way. Over and over he says that God could have had reasons to do it some other way or that God need not be like we think he is. Every time he says this, I expect to be given some alternative explanation for God's motives, but it never arrives. All we get is the point that we are making at least some assumptions about God. And Hunter is completely correct about this.

Somehow, Hunter seems to think this is a victory for ID. However, it actually shows the complete vacuity of ID. He is right. God could do anything he wanted for any reason he wanted. God need not be logical. God need not actually want a well-designed world. God could have reasons completely beyond our understanding. So God could do anything. In making this argument, Hunter is showing that ID is completely untestable and makes absolutely no predictions. There is no observation that could not be explained by ID.

ID need not be this way. If it had the guts to say something specific about the designer, it would be testable. If we could say that God designs things to be optimal in function, we could test it. We could see if in fact structures are optimal or suboptimal, and thus possible disprove ID. If we could say that the designer would not only make things that have a function, we could see if there are in fact non functional structures. Scientists, generously trying to treat ID like an actual theory, do just this. They say, "if God designed like X, then we should see Y. We don't see Y, so God did not design like X." An ID proponent such as Hunter considers this to be silly. Any statement more specific than "God designs" is unacceptable. Thus, ID is not science.

However, proponents of ID aren't consistent in letting God get away with anything. They are constantly pointing out that some structure--a flagellum, an eye, etc.--is very well designed, by human standards. They are then making assumptions about God. They are treating God like a human designer. They say "the eye is well designed, according to human criteria, so there must have been a desinger". They make theological assumptions about what God would and would not design in this case. Yet if a scientist then tries to use those same assumptions, we are making unjustified intrustions into theology. You can't have it both ways. If we accept Hunter's unwillingness to make any theological assumptions about design at all, then we can not make any positive case for design either.

That is the core argument of this chapter of the book: Scientists treat ID like a falsifiable theory, but doing so reuqires some theological assumptions, so evolution is a religion. That is circular and points out the deepest flaw in ID. The argument also depends on the claim that all evidence for evolution is actually just arguments against design. The irony of the latter argument should not be missed: ID consists almost entirely of negative arguments against evolution, with no positive case at all. Yet Hunter is claiming that evolution consists only of negative arguments against ID. Perhaps he sees it that way because that is the mind set ID proponents always take. His case in this regard is especially weak and consists of a lot of handwaving.

I considered Hunter's main argument in this post. In my next post, I will dissect some specific claims in this chapter.