Darwin's proof, chapter 6, part II

I am critiquing CG Hunter's Darwin's Proof. In the last post I discussed the overall argument of chapter 6. Here, I will discuss particular details or errors made by Hunter.

Hunter often makes the distinction between micro and macroevolution, but not explicitely. In discussing Darwin’s finches, he agrees they show species aren’t fixed, although he qualifies it with “true, the amount of evolution was tiny." Here he subtly hints at a micro/macro evolution distinction, which he continues to do throughout the book. He never suggests a possible limit to change, just that observed change isn't much. Basically, he admits there is evidence against the fixity of species, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t fixity of “kinds”. We just don’t know what a kind is, or what evidence would show they aren’t fixed. He claims there is no evidence that small scale change is capable of of large scale evolution, but he also never gives any reason to think it isn't capable of it, other than the limits of his imagination. He ignores the evidence for large scale evolution or the fact that many patters, from DNA to biogeography, appear at larger scales exactly as they appear at smaller scales.

At one point he states “evolution is anything except divine creation. This is the reason evolution is such a flexible theory.” No, evolution is not anything except divine creation, except in his mind. He says this only because any and all possible materialistic explanations for life would be equally offensive to him, so he lumps them together. And after defining evolution this way, he complains because evolutionists bring up God when they discuss alternatives. Of course, they don’t bring up God when they bring up materialistic alternatives, but they necessarily bring up God when the alternative is God.

Hunter repeatedly adds little asides about our ignorance of every detailed step in the evolution of some particular structure or organism: “God, according to Darwin, would not have made the brain or the bat that we find nature, though he had little idea about how they actually worked.” “Darwin pointed out there are patterns between species that do not reflect good design. Darwin could not explain how such creatures evolved with any level of details, but his could be explained later.” Etc. Hunter seems to be of the common opinion that if we can’t explain every last step and intermediate in the evolution of organism, then we can’t say anything. But science doesn’t work that way. Instead, we ask what patterns would we expect to see in the world of evolution is true, and see if those patterns are observed. We see if alternative theories could also explain those observations, or predict patterns. Design fails to predict any pattern.

Hunter's attempt to deal with pseudogenes is the most problematic section of the chapter. He actually makes a case for evolution. First, he says that evolution doesn’t predict pseudogenes. It's true that if we only had evolution, we wouldn't automatically know pseudogenes must exist. It’s not that based on first principles we predict the existence of pseudogenes, but rather that evolution has a testable explanation for them and predicts the patterns we see in pseudogenes.

Hunter says that pseudogenes do not always align as they should and they may be scattered about, or that some pseudogenes actually have a function. He does not give any reference for this, so I cannot determine exactly what he is talking about. However, he does admit evolutionary biologists have an explanation for these, but then falls back on his usual argument—because we have explanations for exceptions, evolution can explain any pattern. But the explanations for exceptions to the expected pattern must be independently testable. We do not just explain away data, but come up with theories to explain when we will see one pattern and when another.

Then Hunter has his most revealing paragraph, which is worth quoting in full:

Finally, the idea that pseudogenes arose and were passed on does not require evolution. Yes, the pseudogenes of species have been inherited from their ancestors, but this does not mean that we must resort to the unlikely story of evolution to explain them.

I cannot make sense of this. The middle sentence is an open admission that pseudogenes have been inherited from their ancestors, but the sentences before and after this say that this does not require evolution. Isn’t that what evolution is? If two organisms both inherited a gene from an ancestor, doesn’t mean that common descent is true? The only sense I can make of this paragraph, is that he argues this isn’t evidence for natural selection as the cause. No one claims this is evidence for selection. There are two questions: are organisms related by common descent, and was selection the mechanism that caused changes? Much of the evidence for evolution is evidence for the former, including the common position of pseudogenes. Also, notice how he adds the word “unlikely” to describe evolution, as if its unlikelihood has already been established.

He then describes the gene to make vitamin C, and how it is inactivated in exactly the same way in all primates, implying inactivation in a common ancestor. Why would a gene that doesn’t work be designed into similar species in the same way, evolutionists say. How does Hunter respond? “the similarity of the pseudogene among primates proves little. There are multitudes of similarities between the primates that evolutionists could use as evidence.” How is that even an answer? In the previous paragraph, he admitted that pseudogenes have been inherited from common ancestors, and here he admits the same psuedogene is found in many primates for no functional reason. This proves little? He admits this shows common ancestry, and it proves a lot to anyone not blinded by ideology. He is correct that there are many similarities between primates that we could point to as evidence, and most of them are evidence. Especially striking are similarities in detail that have no functional reason to be similar, and that follow a nested pattern of similarity. What more could Hunter possibly want? In this section, Hunter has made as strong of a case for common descent as I could have. Furthermore, it is clearly evidence for common descent, not just evidence against design, although he claims that is the case.

Hunter discusses the universal genetic code as evidence for evolution, and he does what is by now a predictable moving of the goal posts. Whenever possible, he changes the discussion to the origin of life. He discusses the complexity of the genetic code and how it could have arisen, rather than whether it is evidence for common ancestry.

Hunter’s attempt to deal with the nested hierarchical patterns produced by evolution also fails. First, he claims it is not evidence for evolution because evolution could produce other patterns as well. This is outright false. Evolution will always produce a nested pattern. We see this in other things that share ancestry by common descent, like languages or chain letters. He then again quotes scientists such as Darwin saying that if things were independently created, there would be no explanation for these patterns. Hunter finds this offensive, because it is possible that God could have done it that way. The problem is with his understanding of the word “explanation”. For most people, explaining something means understanding one thing in reference to something else, understanding a cause, understanding why it is this way rather than another way. In that sense, creationists have no explanation. However, for creationists such as Hunter “it’s that way just because it is” is an explanation. Godditit is an explanation.

Discussing the fossil evidence, first Hunter makes the absurd claim that fossils are not evidence for evolution, but just evidence against creation. Evolution clearly predicts intermediates, regardless of whether creation is offered as an alternative explanation. He then tries to cast doubt on the fossil record by saying:

When similar forms are arranged, there are always ambiguities. In some cases, there are too many species, leaving evoluionists with a multitude of possible lineages and the need for explanatory devidecs such as convergent evolution. Some species may overlap in time and show no sign of merging one into the other. Or there may be unique and advance forms appearing too early

This is so confused I don’t know where to begin. I don’t know what “too many species” means. He seems to be complaining that in some cases the fossil record is so complete that we are not certain of all of the branching relationships. How does that call into question the evidence? He dismisses convergent evolution as an “explanatory device” which is what he does with every kind of evidence. He still sees any explanation we have for deviations from a single pattern as an ad hoc excuse, made to rescue the theory. Convergent evolution is an objective, testable explanation for patterns. If Hunter had ever studied cladistic analysis he would know this. Similar species overlap in time all the time, including today. That is not a problem, and why he thinks they should be merging I have no idea. “Advanced” forms can appear before some more primitive forms that are on another branch. Evolution is a bush, not a ladder. There are no examples of advanced forms appearing before the necessary precursor forms, such as a rabbit in the Cambrian period. That would disprove evolution.

What is most striking in reading Hunter's discussion of the evidence for evolution is how he often nicely represents the evidence for evolution. Even with his misrepresentations, he makes a decent case. His attempts to dismiss it are less convincing. He is just uncomfortable with the complexity of a theory. His main complaint is that evolution doesn't produce one and only one result. Evolution has an annoying habit of explaining both the main patterns we see in life, as well as all of the nasty exceptions. The fact that his theory does the same, or any possible successful theory must do the same, is lost on him.

Darwin's proof, Chapter 6, part 1

After a long delay, I am ready to review chapter 6 of Darwin's Proof, by Cornelius G Hunter. You will find the reviews of earlier chapters in other recent posts. I think chapter 6 is getting into the meat of the book. Previous chapters have been routine criticisms of evolution. In this chapter, Hunter gets into his main philosophical argument. I believe this is the argument for which he is best known--I understand it was the main focus of his earlier book. Again this argument is not unique, but he makes it in perhaps a slightly different way than other creationists.

What is Hunter's key argument? He argues that evolution is a religion, just like creationism. More specifically, he claims that the evidence for evolution depends on theological assumptions and would not be valid without these. Unfortunately for Hunter, when you look at the implications of his argument, it only shows why intelligent design fails as science.

To understand Hunter's argument, we need to take one of the categories of evidence for evolution. Let's take the existence of vestigial organs. He does the exact same analysis with every kind of evidence for evolution, so we can use this as an example. First, he claims that it is not really evidence for evolution itself. Evolution would not necessarily predict this. Usually he is wrong about this, as I will show. He argues that it is only evidence if it contrasted with some version of creationism. So he says that the only way vestigial organs are evidence for evolution is if you argue that God would not produce useless structures. It's not that vestigial organs are direct evidence for evolution, rather vestigial organs are evidence against creation. At this point, he usually quotes a few biologists saying that this item (vestigial organs, etc.) could not possibly have been created by God. His final point is that this argument depends on theological assumptions about God. It assumes one particular kind of God. Who is to say that God wouldn't produce useless structures? Evolutionary biologists are assuming a particular kind of God, such as a God like a human designer, and vestigial organs are only evidence for evolution if you assume the existence of that particular God. Thus, vestigial organs are only evidence for evolution within some theological frameworks and depends on religious assumptions.

Unfortunately, his argument fails at every level. All of the kinds of evidence he discusses are in fact predicted or explained by evolution, and would be evidence for evolution even without consideration of creationism as an alternative. Common arrangement of pseudogenes are clear evidence for common descent, by themselves. The biogeographic patterns of organims make most sence and are explained by common places of origins of groups of species. The nested pattern of similarities of organisms are exactly what is expected from evolution, and Darwin was the first person to explain why this pattern would exist. The same is true of all of the other kinds of evidence. For all of these, Hunter claims that they are not directly predicted by evolution, but only work as evidence against creationism.

The easiest way to see that this is not so is to consider what we would think if no one had ever thought of creationism as an explanation for species. If Hunter is correct, the evidence for evolution is only evidence against creationism, not evidence for evolution. In that case, if there was a world where no one had ever considered the possibility that God created species, none of this evidence would be convincing. There isn't a single category of evidence that wouldn't be convincing in such a world. Both Humans and Chimpanzees lack the gene to make vitamin C, and is inactivated with exactly the same mutation in both species. This can be explained by a single mutation being inherited by both species, without any reference to God.

In fact, there is such an example of common descent without comparison to theological arguments. The languages of the world are related by common descent. How do we know this? Languages form nested patterns of similarity. Languages have vestigial spellings and odd meanings and words. Languages show geographic patterns similar to organisms. Languages have old manuscripts that show a pattern of progressive change. All of these are evidence that languages evolved from a common ancestor, without having to bring in any theological assumptions. These are the same kinds of evidence used to show evolution of life.

Of course, Hunter can find many quotes of scientists saying that God would not have made vestigial structures or nested patterns, etc. That's because they are arguing against creationism. Like it or not, creationism is a commonly held belief out there, so it is common to show how evolution explains things better than creationism. Hunter objects to the fact that these scientists bring up God when they do this. How exactly can you argue against a religious claim without bringing up religion?

That is the essence of Hunters argument. When scientists argue against religious arguments, they use religious assumptions, therefore evolution is religion. He never explains how we could possibly argue against ID or creationism without ever actually mentioning the designer or God at the heart of the theory.

However, Hunter is correct in one key point: whenver anyone argues against creationism, you have to make some theological assumptions. If I argue that there is no logical reason for God to put the exact same mutation in both Humans and Chimps, I am making assumptions about what God would and would not do. If I say that the vertebrate eye seems to be poorly designed and God would not make such an eye, I am assuming that God would want to make well designed things. Hunter repeatedly points out that this might not be the case. God could have made things this way for his own inscrutible reasons. He never actually offers a single explanation for why God would have done it this way. Over and over he says that God could have had reasons to do it some other way or that God need not be like we think he is. Every time he says this, I expect to be given some alternative explanation for God's motives, but it never arrives. All we get is the point that we are making at least some assumptions about God. And Hunter is completely correct about this.

Somehow, Hunter seems to think this is a victory for ID. However, it actually shows the complete vacuity of ID. He is right. God could do anything he wanted for any reason he wanted. God need not be logical. God need not actually want a well-designed world. God could have reasons completely beyond our understanding. So God could do anything. In making this argument, Hunter is showing that ID is completely untestable and makes absolutely no predictions. There is no observation that could not be explained by ID.

ID need not be this way. If it had the guts to say something specific about the designer, it would be testable. If we could say that God designs things to be optimal in function, we could test it. We could see if in fact structures are optimal or suboptimal, and thus possible disprove ID. If we could say that the designer would not only make things that have a function, we could see if there are in fact non functional structures. Scientists, generously trying to treat ID like an actual theory, do just this. They say, "if God designed like X, then we should see Y. We don't see Y, so God did not design like X." An ID proponent such as Hunter considers this to be silly. Any statement more specific than "God designs" is unacceptable. Thus, ID is not science.

However, proponents of ID aren't consistent in letting God get away with anything. They are constantly pointing out that some structure--a flagellum, an eye, etc.--is very well designed, by human standards. They are then making assumptions about God. They are treating God like a human designer. They say "the eye is well designed, according to human criteria, so there must have been a desinger". They make theological assumptions about what God would and would not design in this case. Yet if a scientist then tries to use those same assumptions, we are making unjustified intrustions into theology. You can't have it both ways. If we accept Hunter's unwillingness to make any theological assumptions about design at all, then we can not make any positive case for design either.

That is the core argument of this chapter of the book: Scientists treat ID like a falsifiable theory, but doing so reuqires some theological assumptions, so evolution is a religion. That is circular and points out the deepest flaw in ID. The argument also depends on the claim that all evidence for evolution is actually just arguments against design. The irony of the latter argument should not be missed: ID consists almost entirely of negative arguments against evolution, with no positive case at all. Yet Hunter is claiming that evolution consists only of negative arguments against ID. Perhaps he sees it that way because that is the mind set ID proponents always take. His case in this regard is especially weak and consists of a lot of handwaving.

I considered Hunter's main argument in this post. In my next post, I will dissect some specific claims in this chapter.